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Institutional Interaction in Global 
Environmental Governance: The Case of 
the Cartagena Protocol and the World 
Trade Organization 
• 
Sebastian Oberthür and Thomas Gehring* 
Introduction 
This article explores the relationship between the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety from the point of view of insti-
tutional interaction. In order to do this, we propose a conceptual framework for 
analyzing institutional interaction. Despite a growing interest of both scholars 
and policy-makers in the issue of institutional interaction, the conceptual devel-
opment of its analysis is still at an early stage. Institutional interaction (or inter-
play) generally refers to the phenomenon that international institutions 
inºuence each other in ways that are relevant for their development and effec-
tiveness. A number of studies have highlighted the challenges and, less 
frequently, the opportunities such interaction poses to international (environ-
mental) governance.1 Although a number of useful distinctions have been intro-
duced,2 no encompassing conceptual framework has emerged that could serve 
as a general basis for the empirical investigation of speciªc cases. In particular, 
few efforts have been made to enlighten the ways in which institutional interac-
tion comes about.3 
Given this assessment, it is hardly surprising that studies of the relation-
ship between the WTO and the international biosafety regime have not yet been 
* This paper was prepared in the context of an initiative of the United Nations University. A 
somewhat modified version will appear in the forthcoming book volume Institutional Interplay: 
The Case of Biosafety, edited by W. Bradnee Chambers and Joy A. Kim (Tokyo: UN University). 
The conceptual framework presented has been developed in the framework of a European re-
search project supported by the European Community (EVK-CT-2000-00079 INTERACTION). 
The results of this research project are presented in Oberthür and Gehring 2006b. We would 
like to thank three anonymous reviewers, Oran R. Young and Rhiannon Williams for providing 
comments on previous versions of this paper. 
1. Young 2002; for a number of concrete case studies see Oberthür 2001 and 2003; Rosendal 2000 
and 2001; Andersen 2002; and Jacquemont and Caparrós 2002. 
2. Young 1996; Young et al. 1999; and Young 2002. 
3 . But see Stokke 2001a and b. 
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predicated on elaborate concepts of institutional interaction. The tense and po-
tentially conºicting relationship between the international trade order repre-
sented by the WTO and various multilateral environmental agreements, such as 
the Cartagena Protocol, constitutes a prominent element of the broader agenda 
of institutional interaction.4 Studies on the relationship between the Cartagena 
Protocol and the WTO have so far focused either on the importance of this rela-
tionship in the negotiations on the Cartagena Protocol or on the analysis of the 
scope for inconsistency and conºict between both sets of norms and rules.5 
In this paper, we offer an encompassing conceptual framework for analyz-
ing empirical cases of institutional interaction and their governance implica-
tions. We further illustrate the fruitfulness of this framework by applying it to 
the analysis of the relationship between the WTO and the Cartagena Protocol. 
The conceptual framework rests on two pillars. First, we suggest that the analysis 
of institutional interaction should start from clearly identiªed cases of interac-
tion involving two institutions connected by one causal relationship. Second, 
we introduce a number of distinct causal mechanisms and subtypes of these 
mechanisms that are characterized by distinct causal pathways and different 
governance conditions. We submit that every case of institutional interaction 
follows one of these causal mechanisms. 
Applying this conceptual framework to the interaction between the inter-
national biosafety regime and the WTO regarding the regulation of interna-
tional trade in genetically modiªed organisms (GMOs) reveals a stepwise de-
limitation of the jurisdictions of both institutions. The overall interaction 
consists of two separate instances in which inter-institutional inºuence runs in 
opposite directions. Both cases of interaction follow a common causal mecha-
nism driven by anticipated and actual commitments of parties under both insti-
tutions. On the basis of the diverging objectives of the WTO and the biosafety 
regime as pursued by different groups of countries and policy communities, the 
interest of states that are parties to both agreements in avoiding inconsistent 
commitments drives both cases towards a jurisdictional delimitation of both in-
stitutions. While each of the institutions involved has had a disruptive inºuence 
on the other by restricting its room for regulatory activity, the resulting jurisdic-
tional delimitation in which the Cartagena Protocol proved a surprising 
strength has limited the potential for conºict between both regimes. 
The interest of states that are parties to both agreements in avoiding incon-
sistent commitments is also likely to frame the future evolution of the relation-
ship between the regimes. All else being equal, potential future political and ju-
dicial decision-making in both regimes is constrained by existing commitments 
that will tend to drive both regimes toward developing in compatible ways. 
While major political initiatives to change the current jurisdictional balance 
hold little promise, the relationship between both regimes is to be worked out 
4. E.g. Brack, 2002; Schoenbaum 2002; and Shaw and Schwartz 2002. 
5. See e.g. contributions in Bail, Falkner, and Marquard 2002; Adler 2000; Burgiel 2002; Eggers 
and Mackenzie 2000; Rivera-Torres 2003; and Safrin 2002b. 
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further in their implementation “on the ground” when states regulate trade in 
GMOs. Judicial decision-making on related challenges of national regulations 
under the WTO dispute-settlement procedures or the compliance mechanism of 
the Cartagena Protocol may result in a further delimitation of jurisdictions. 
Overall, there is a good chance that both regimes will develop in consistent 
ways in the future. 
The analysis reveals the general structure of institutional interaction of the 
jurisdictional-delimitation type that is characterized by the competitive quest of 
two (or more) institutions for jurisdictional authority and occurs more fre-
quently in global environmental governance. It enables us to identify the under-
lying driving forces and the consequences of the interaction. It emerges that the 
structure of international governance provides for powerful forces driving insti-
tutions with differing objectives—such as the biosafety regime and the WTO— 
towards a jurisdictional balance that contains and limits the potential for 
conºict. While the institution regulating the ªe ld prior to the other acquires a 
ªrst-mover advantage, which side is more successful in determining the even-
tual jurisdictional balance is subject to the vagaries of the political process based 
on interests of varying strength—with all accompanying uncertainties and at-
tractions. Thus, although the allegedly powerful WTO was ªrst in structuring the 
regulatory ªe ld of international trade in GMOs, the seemingly weak Cartagena 
Protocol showed surprising strength in assuming regulatory authority and in ex-
ploiting the remaining room for maneuver. 
2. Conceptualizing Institutional Interaction 
2.1 Establishing a Single Cause-Effect Relationship between Two Institutions 
Interaction, or interplay, between international institutions—be it international 
regimes or international organizations—requires that one institution (the 
source institution) affects the development or performance of another institu-
tion (the target institution).6 To establish an incident of institutional interac-
tion, we must identify (1) the independent variable, namely the source institu-
tion and more speciªcally its particular component(s) or decision(s) from 
which inºuence originates; (2) the dependent variable, i.e. the target institution 
and more speciªcally its particular component(s) that are subject to inºuence 
originating from the source institution; and (3) a cause-effect relationship be-
tween the source institution and the target institution accounting for the 
identiªed effect. Demonstrating a cause-effect relationship requires identifying 
the precise causal mechanism that drives the incident of institutional interac-
tion and leads to an observable or anticipated effect within the target institution 
or the issue-area governed by it. Causal mechanisms are addressed in more de-
tail in section 2.2 below. 
In order to allow for serious causal analysis, we suggest disaggregating 
6. Breitmeier 2000; and Gehring and Oberthür 2004. 
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complex real-world interaction situations into an appropriate number of cases of 
interaction with a single source institution, a single target institution, and a uni-
directional causal mechanism connecting the two. Disaggregation will be espe-
cially required in three types of situations. First, two institutions may be in-
volved in numerous cases of interaction at the same time. For example, the 
Montreal Protocol for the protection of the ozone layer indirectly promotes the 
use of certain greenhouse gases (hydroºuorocarbons, HFCs) regulated under 
the Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Con-
currently, it mandates the phase-out of chloroºuorocarbons (CFCs) that are po-
tent greenhouse gases, thus supporting the objective of the international climate 
change regime. Moreover, the Montreal Protocol’s non-compliance procedure 
provided a precedent for the elaboration of a similar component within the cli-
mate change regime.7 
Second, an interaction situation may involve more than two institutions. 
For example, the Baltic Sea is affected by several global environmental regimes 
addressing, inter alia, oil pollution from ships and dumping of wastes at sea, an 
important regional regime (Helsinki Convention for the protection of the Baltic 
Sea), and overall arrangements such as the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).8 The institutions co-governing this area may interact 
with each other in various ways—either by affecting each others’ performance or 
by inºuencing each others’ decision-making processes. 
Third, two or more institutions may “co-evolve” over time with inºuence 
running back and forth between the institutions so that neither of the institu-
tions would exist in its current state in the absence of the other. In this case, dis-
tinguishing a suitable number of pairs of institutions connected by unidirec-
tional causal pathways requires that we disaggregate the process analytically 
into sequential cases over time.9 For example, the co-evolution of the global 
Basel Convention on the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes and 
several related regional regimes can be disaggregated into two phases. In the ªrst 
analytical phase, the unsatisfactorily weak global Basel Convention caused vari-
ous developing countries to adopt separate regional regimes prohibiting the im-
port of hazardous wastes. In the second phase, the existence of these regional re-
gimes strengthened those advocating a ban on waste exports from OECD 
countries to non-OECD developing countries that was eventually agreed under 
the global regime.10 
The effects or consequences of a case of institutional interaction may be 
beneªcial, adverse, or neutral for the target institution. The main effects of insti-
tutional interaction occur in the target institution and can be assessed against 
this institution’s prime objective. This approach builds on the established re-
search on the effectiveness of international institutions. That work has also used 
7. Oberthür 2001. 
8. Young 1996. 
9. Archer 1985; and Carlsnaes 1992. 
10. Meinke 2002; and Clapp 1994. 
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an institution’s prime objective as the major yardstick for assessing its conse-
quences.11 In contrast to this line of research, the causes and effects of institu-
tional interaction are located in the domains of different institutions so that the 
prime objective of the target institution is used as the relevant yardstick. If the 
effects of a case of institutional interaction support the objectives of the target 
institution, they therefore create synergy between the two institutions involved. 
If they contradict the target’s objective, they result in disruption and conºict. The 
aforementioned inºuence of the Montreal Protocol on the climate change re-
gime provides suitable examples for synergistic (CFCs) and disruptive (HFCs) 
effects. The effects of an interaction may also be indeterminate or neutral, if they 
do not clearly hamper or reinforce the target institution’s pursuit of its objec-
tive.12 
Our research strategy is based on the assumption that complex interaction 
situations can be properly understood by disaggregating them into a suitable 
number of clear-cut cases. While this approach allows for a clear causal analysis, 
it does not preclude that we recombine cases to form a more complex picture. 
Co-evolution processes such as the one between the Basel Convention and sev-
eral regional regimes can be analyzed and understood as a causal chain in 
which one case of interaction triggers the next. In other cases, clusters of parallel 
cases of interaction such as those related to the Baltic Sea may be recombined. 
Recombining cases of interaction to more complex interaction situations in 
principle also allows us to grasp the “emergent properties” of the larger situa-
tion, i.e. any logic or rationale that emerges only from the complexity of the sit-
uation or from the combination of cases (as opposed to the sum of the individ-
ual cases).13 
2.2 Causal Mechanisms of Institutional Interaction 
To establish the cause-effect relationship between the source and the target insti-
tutions, we must identify the precise causal mechanism that drives an incident 
of institutional interaction.14 A causal mechanism is a set of statements that are 
logically connected and provide a plausible account of how a given cause cre-
ates an observed effect.15 Since international institutions do not act on their 
own, actors such as states and other stakeholders that negotiate, develop and 
implement the relevant agreements are essential elements of a causal mecha-
nism that drives institutional interaction.16 To identify a causal mechanism driv-
ing institutional interaction, we must demonstrate (1) how the identiªed com-
ponent of the source institution affects the preferences or behavior of relevant 
11. E.g. Miles et al. 2002; Young 1999; and Haas, Keohane, and Levy 1993. 
12. Gehring and Oberthür 2006, 310–311. 
13 . Gehring and Oberthür 2006, 358–367. 
14. Elster 1989, 3–10; and Hedström and Swedberg 1998. 
15. Schelling 1998. 
16. See also Selin and VanDeveer 2003. 
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actors, (2) that this leads to a change of the preferences or individual behavior 
of actors relevant to the target institution, and (3) that these changes of prefer-
ences or behavior produce the effect observed within the target institution or its 
issue-area (Figure 1). In the following, we introduce four general causal mecha-
nisms that may drive interaction between two international institutions. In two 
of these causal mechanisms that are derived from different theories of institu-
tions, negotiation theory and cooperation theory, the source institution directly 
inºuences the rule-making process of the target (section 2.2.1). The other two 
causal mechanisms are characterized by the fact that the source institution 
inºuences the implementation and effectiveness of the target institution (rather 
than its decision-making process) (section 2.2.2).17 
2.2.1 Interaction Inºuencing the Decision-Making Process of the Target Institution 
In order to inºuence the rule-making of another institution, the source institu-
tion has to inºuence the preferences of decision-makers operating within the 
target institution. This may happen in two ways. First, the source institution 
may produce important new information, knowledge or ideas (cognitive inter-
action). Second, the commitments introduced by one institution may affect the 
preferences of actors negotiating within another institution (interaction 
through commitment). In addition, different sub-types of these causal mecha-
nisms can be distinguished. They vary with respect to key characteristics that 
matter from a governance perspective.18 
Cognitive interaction is purely based on persuasion and may be conceived 
of as a particular form of inter-institutional learning.19 It occurs if information, 
knowledge or ideas20 produced within one institution modify the perception of 
relevant decision-makers in another institution. It is based on the assumption 
that in real-world situations the rationality of actors is usually “bounded,” ei-
ther because the actors do not have all relevant information or because their in-
formation processing capacity is limited.21 Actors will therefore be prepared to 
adapt their perceptions to new information. These perceptions then shape their 
interests.22 For this to happen, the collective decision-making process of the 
source institution must produce some new information that, upon its transfer 
to the target institution, changes the order of preferences of relevant actors and 
thus inºuences the collective negotiation process of the target institution and its 
output. The source institution does not exert any pressure. However, once rele-
vant actors adapt their preferences, the consequences will be felt even by those 
participants of the process which have not been convinced. 
17. The causal mechanisms are discussed in more detail in Oberthür and Gehring 2006a, 31–42. 
18. A more detailed discussion of the subtypes of the causal mechanisms and their characteristics 
can be found in Gehring and Oberthür 2006, 325–356. 
19. See also Stokke 2001b, 10. 
20. Risse-Kappen 1994; and Yee 1996. 
21. Simon 1972. 
22. Checkel 1998; and Risse 2000. 
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Figure 1 
Causal Mechanism of Institutional Interaction 
Macro-level: 
institutions 
Micro-level: 
actors 
Source institution 
• rules, norms, decisions 
• knowledge 
• change of perception 
• change of preference 
• change of behavior 
Target institution 
rules, norms, decisions 
performance/effectiveness 
> 
change of preference 
change of behavior 
Source: Adapted from Coleman 1990: 1–23; and Hedström and Swedberg 1998: 21–23. 
We can distinguish two different ideal types of cognitive interaction de-
pending on whether the interaction is initiated by the source or the target. First, 
the target institution may initiate the interaction by drawing on aspects of other 
institutions as a policy model to devise a solution to a problem it faces. For exam-
ple, negotiators of the Kyoto Protocol on climate change used the compliance 
system under the Montreal Protocol for the protection of the ozone layer as a 
policy model when elaborating a similar system.23 Second, the source institu-
tion may trigger the interaction by issuing a request for assistance to the target 
without having a particular means available to support its wish. For example, 
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora (CITES) requested assistance from the World Customs Organization 
(WCO) and Interpol to help enforce its trade restrictions.24 
Interaction through commitment is based on the fact that a commitment en-
tered into within an international institution may change actors’ preferences 
within another institution. It is closely related to the categories of “normative” 
and “utilitarian” interplay introduced by Stokke.25 At a minimum, actors may be 
expected to develop an interest in passing compatible decisions in international 
forums to which they are parties in order to be able to comply with their com-
mitments. Otherwise, they could neither preserve a reputation of keeping their 
23. Oberthür and Ott 1999, 215–222; and Werksman 2005. 
24. Lanchbery 2006. 
25. Stokke 2001b. 
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promises providing the basis of future cooperation26 nor preserve the beneªts of 
cooperation that depend on stabilizing the prospects for compliance.27 Mem-
bers of an institution may also easily accept a commitment which they have al-
ready subscribed to in another institution because it does not involve additional 
costs. They may become interested in the transfer of a commitment to other in-
stitutions if this promises additional beneªts such as the extension of the com-
mitment to potential competitors. Being aware of the binding force of obliga-
tions, they may even gain an interest in adopting commitments in one 
institution in order to frame the policy choices available in another institution. 
As a result, actors may appear to either pursue “legal consistency” or “strategic 
inconsistency.”28 
Interaction through commitment involves, ªrst, that members of the 
source institution agree upon an obligation that might be relevant for the target 
institution. Second, this obligation must actually commit one or more mem-
bers of the source institution. Third, it must induce at least one member of the 
target institution to change its preferences. Fourth, this must inºuence the col-
lective decision-making process of the target institution and its output. In the 
ideal case of interaction through commitment, an obligation originating from 
the source institution will affect a subsequent decision-making process of the 
target institution on a related subject. However, anticipated commitments to be 
entered into within the source institution may also trigger the mechanism. 
Interaction through commitment requires a certain overlap of both the 
memberships and the issue-areas of the interacting institutions and, in contrast 
to cognitive interaction, it does not completely depend on the target institution. 
Without a jurisdictional overlap of issue-areas, commitments entered into in 
one institution could not become relevant to another. Without overlapping 
memberships, the target institution would remain unaffected because none of 
its members would be subject to relevant commitments. While in the case of 
cognitive interaction the relevant actors modify their preferences entirely volun-
tarily, interaction through commitment incites them to do so because of the 
costs and beneªts involved. 
We can distinguish three ideal types of interaction through commitment. 
First, interaction between nested institutions may help extend an obligation from a 
smaller institution to an institution with a larger membership and similar ob-
jectives. Because all members of the smaller institution will tend to favor the ex-
tension of the obligation, the relevant coalition in the bigger institution will be 
strengthened. For example, the ban on dumping and incineration of waste at 
sea within the regional regime for the protection of the North-East Atlantic 
(Oslo and Paris Conventions, OSPAR) led to the adoption of similar measures 
within the global London Dumping Convention.29 Second, a target institution 
26. Keohane 1984, 105–106; and Young 1992, 175–176. 
27. Martin 1993. 
28. Raustiala and Victor 2004, 300–302. 
29. Skjærseth 2006; and Meinke 2002. 
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may take over obligations from a source because the memberships of both insti-
tutions are largely identical so that members of the target can hardly object to 
such a transfer. Such interaction will only be relevant if the target institution has 
additional means available to foster compliance with and enforcement of the ob-
ligation. For example, once political agreement had been reached within the 
soft-law based International North Sea Conferences in the 1980s and 1990s, 
parties to OSPAR easily agreed on hard-law targets for reducing pollution.30 
Both policy diffusion between nested institutions and interaction resulting in 
the activation of additional means will usually enhance global governance. 
In contrast, institutions with differing objectives will tend to regulate over-
lapping issues in diverging ways. Because such cases entail the danger that states 
that are members of both institutions become subject to incompatible commit-
ments, they create a demand for jurisdictional delimitation. They may be resolved 
amicably, but can easily lead to political conºict, if different actors involved in 
the decision-making process prefer different allocation of jurisdictional author-
ity. The tense relationship between the WTO and the Cartagena Protocol (and 
other multilateral environmental agreements) provides a case in point. Section 
3 will therefore shed more light on this type of institutional interaction through 
commitment. 
2.2.2 Interaction Directly Affecting the Implementation and Effectiveness of the 
Target Institution 
In addition to the decision-making of the target institution, the source institu-
tion may directly affect the target’s implementation and effectiveness. To derive 
suitable causal mechanisms we build on the distinction between the output 
(rules and norms), the outcome (i.e. the effects on the behavior of relevant ac-
tors in the issue-area) and the impact of an institution (i.e. its effect on the envi-
ronment or other ultimate target of governance) established in research on the 
effectiveness of international institutions.31 Accordingly, a distinction can be 
made between behavioral interaction at the outcome level and impact-level in-
teraction. 
Behavioral interaction exists if an international institution induces behav-
ioral changes within the issue-area governed by another and thereby inºuences 
its performance. All international governance institutions are designed to 
inºuence the behavior of relevant actors in order to achieve their objectives such 
as protecting the environment or liberalizing international trade.32 Such behav-
ioral effects may also directly or indirectly affect the implementation of another 
institution. For example, increased use of HFCs resulting from the Montreal 
Protocol for the protection of the ozone layer is immediately relevant for the 
30. Skjærseth 2006. 
31. Underdal 2004. 
32. Levy, Young, and Zürn 1995; and Young 1992. 
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implementation of the climate change regime that aims at reducing the emis-
sions of greenhouse gases, including HFCs.33 
Impact-level interaction occurs if an institution’s impact on its ultimate tar-
get of protection, such as free trade or protection of the ozone layer, affects the 
ultimate target of the other institution. In contrast to the other causal mecha-
nisms, impact-level interaction does not involve social interaction between the 
two interacting institutions, but is based on a scientiªc link between the two tar-
gets of governance involved. 
A stylized example that we owe to Arild Underdal may illustrate this least 
intuitive causal mechanism. Consider that protection of the stocks of cod and 
herring are the ultimate targets of two separate international institutions. As cod 
eat herring, successful protection of cod, resulting in a growing population of 
this species, will unintentionally decrease the population of herring. In this 
case, the two institutions involved are not linked at the level of output (neither 
the norms of nor the knowledge produced within the cod regime inºuence the 
norms protecting herring), nor through behavioral changes (decreased ªshing 
of cod does not directly inºuence the ªshing activities related to herring). They 
are “functionally linked”34 at the impact level because the effects of the source 
institution on its ultimate regulatory target (population of cod) affect the ulti-
mate regulatory target of the target institution (population of herring). 
Both behavioral interaction and impact-level interaction are characterized 
by a high ability of the source institution to inºuence the target unilaterally. In 
contrast to interaction at the output level, they do not depend on a decision 
within the target institution. A collective decision by the target institution, or 
the source institution (or a “political linkage” between them35), in response to 
the effects of behavioral or impact-level interaction is possible but such interac-
tion “management”36 is not an essential element of these causal mechanisms 
and the effect will also occur without a policy response. 
2.3 Implications for the Empirical Analysis 
The aforementioned conceptual foundation results in a twofold guidance for 
analyzing the interaction between the WTO and the Cartagena Protocol. First, 
the inter-relationship between the WTO and the Cartagena Protocol should be 
disaggregated into clearly identiªable cases of interaction. Instead of determin-
ing whether both instruments are compatible or have a potential for conºict, 
our approach leads us to ask how exactly each side has inºuenced the other, in 
what ways and with which consequences. It also allows us, by means of recom-
bination of related cases, to obtain an analytically clear overall picture of the in-
teraction situation and its effects. 
33. Oberthür 2001. 
34. Young et al. 1999; and Young 2002. 
35. Young et al. 1999, 50. 
36. Stokke 2001a. 
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Second, particular attention has to be paid to identifying the causal mech-
anisms and ideal types of institutional interaction that each case of interaction 
between the WTO and the Cartagena Protocol follows. Each of the ideal types 
and causal mechanisms is characterized by different rationales, driving forces 
and governance conditions, resulting in varying effects/consequences. For exam-
ple, persuasion is the only means available to the source institution in cases of 
cognitive interaction, while the source can and does inºuence the costs and 
beneªts accruing to certain policy options of the target institution in cases of in-
teraction through commitment. Within the realm of interaction through com-
mitment, there is a gulf of differences distinguishing interaction between nested 
institutions that tends to enhance global governance by means of horizontal 
policy diffusion from issues of jurisdictional delimitation that tend to lead to 
disruption and conºict. 
Overall, our conceptual approach enables us to engage in an exact and dif-
ferentiated diagnosis of institutional interaction, which is a necessary precondi-
tion for devising any adequate policy response. Different causal mechanisms 
and ideal types require different responses and provide different political op-
portunities. Hence, our conceptual approach to analyzing institutional interac-
tion promises to deliver results that are relevant not only for scholars but also 
for policy-makers. 
3. Interactions between the WTO and the Biosafety Regime 
Applying our conceptual framework to the interaction between the biosafety re-
gime and the WTO reveals that both sides have inºuenced each other in the 
past. Disaggregating the interaction situation, we ªrst analyze the inºuence of 
the biosafety regime on the WTO before turning to the ways in which the WTO 
has affected the Cartagena Protocol. Overall, these disruptive cases of interac-
tion have resulted in a stepwise delimitation of jurisdictions between both insti-
tutions. 
3.1 The Biosafety Regime’s Inºuence on the WTO: Assuming Regulatory Authority 
Throughout the 1980s, both economic/trade interests and environmental inter-
ests had made ªrst attempts to span and occupy the newly emerging regulatory 
ªe ld of international trade in genetically modiªed organisms (GMOs). The Or-
ganization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD), the UN In-
dustrial Development Organization (UNIDO), the World Health Organization 
(WHO), the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), as well as the UN 
Environment Programme (UNEP) became involved in the ªeld.37 
Two aspects of the issue of international trade in GMOs were in potential 
conºict and essentially precluded joint regulation of the subject matter. First, 
37. Pythoud and Thomas 2002, 40; and Zedan 2002, 28–33. 
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biotechnology created demand for the establishment of an international market 
so that GMOs could be traded like other goods. This demand was in line with 
the objectives of the world trade regime—then primarily built upon the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)—and was reºected in the trade interests 
of GMO exporters. At the same time, the spread of GMOs entailed new risks for 
the environment and for existing socio-economic structures. These risks created 
demand for regulation to protect “biosafety,” i.e. the protection of biological di-
versity and established socio-economic structures against the risks associated 
with the spread of GMOs. Protective regulation would restrict markets so that 
the two demands for market creation and market restriction were pointing in 
opposite directions.38 
Trade interests were ªrst in occupying the newly emerging ground of regu-
lating trade in GMOs by means of the WTO agreements of 1994. The GATT does 
not limit the general ability of countries to restrict trade in GMOs.39 Conse-
quently, members of the world trade regime prior to the establishment of the 
WTO agreements were free to restrict market access of genetically modiªed 
products, as long as this restriction applied to GMOs of both foreign and do-
mestic origin (principle of national treatment). The new Agreement on the Ap-
plication of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures of 1994 (SPS Agreement) 
changed this situation and made import restrictions subject to a number of re-
quirements. In particular, it requires that measures restricting the import of 
GMOs (and other products) for sanitary or phytosanitary reasons be based on 
sufªcient scientiªc evidence and a risk assessment that conforms to certain stan-
dards deªned by the Agreement and further developed through interpretation 
by the WTO dispute settlement organs.40 Socio-economic considerations, al-
though not explicitly excluded, are not recognized in this risk assessment.41 Fur-
thermore, Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement subjects precautionary measures to a 
number of conditions. In particular, it requires that scientiªc evidence be 
insufªcient; that measures be adopted “on the basis of available pertinent infor-
mation”; that the party concerned seeks to obtain the information necessary for 
a full risk assessment; and that it reviews the measure “within a reasonable peri-
od of time.” The WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agree-
ment) that was strengthened in 1994 may be of lesser relevance for trade in 
GMOs. It establishes certain criteria that technical regulations such as labeling 
requirements have to fulªll and might apply to restrictions on GMO imports for 
other than sanitary or phytosanitary purposes.42 
Against this backdrop, the biosafety regime ªrst began to inºuence the 
WTO in 1995 when it increasingly claimed authority for regulating trade in 
38. On the issue in general see e.g. Falkner 2000, 300–303. 
39. Rivera-Torres 2003, 289–291; and Boisson de Chazournes and Mbengue 2004, 291–294. 
40. E.g. Rivera-Torres 2003, 296–298. 
41. Gupta 2001. 
42. For relevant analyses of the WTO agreements see Rivera-Torres 2003; Eggers and Mackenzie 
2000; Howse and Meltzer 2002; and Safrin 2002b. 
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GMOs. In 1995, parties to the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) launched ne-
gotiations on a biosafety protocol.43 To be sure, the undertaking of establishing 
a biosafety protocol was broader than assuming authority for trade in GMOs— 
or, as they are called in the context of the biosafety regime, “living modiªed or-
ganisms” (LMOs)—from the WTO. Most importantly, the protocol aims at pro-
viding guidance and assistance to developing countries which lack sufªcient ca-
pacities for enacting and implementing suitable domestic rules. Deªning more 
clearly the rights of countries to restrict GMO imports—as opposed to the re-
strictions of these rights under the WTO—formed, however, a central part of the 
endeavor.44 In this respect, the Cartagena Protocol was to elaborate more spe-
ciªc rules for one sub-area of international trade regulated by the WTO, namely 
trade in GMOs. 
How far-reaching this claim for regulatory authority over trade in GMOs 
was only became clear during the course of negotiations and in particular from 
1998. Parties had varying positions on the extent to which trade in GMOs 
would be subject to the emerging Protocol rules and many participants initially 
did not fully grasp the agreement’s implications for GMO trade. The resolve of 
the EU environment ministers, for example, was signiªcantly strengthened by 
the negative outcome of the WTO dispute over beef hormones in 1998. Overall, 
awareness of the trade implications of the emerging Protocol grew gradually 
and matured from 1998.45 
The negotiations on a biosafety protocol under the CBD inºuenced the in-
ternational interest constellation regarding the regulation of trade in GMOs. Be-
cause parties to the CBD had effectively committed themselves to introducing 
speciªc rules on restricting trade in GMOs, WTO members (and others) inter-
ested in preventing the WTO from further regulating trade in GMOs were sig-
niªcantly strengthened. For those members of both regimes in favor of free 
trade in GMOs, negotiating and introducing relevant rules in the WTO would 
have meant not to honor the commitment made under the CBD. For those 
countries advocating regulation under the CBD, it would have meant weaken-
ing the jurisdictional authority of the biosafety regime. For both sides, it would 
have entailed the danger of elaborating inconsistent provisions. 
As a result of this inºuence on actors’ preferences, the biosafety regime 
helped block attempts to further regulate biotechnology under the WTO in 
1999. Proposals for regulating biotechnology under the WTO were made by 
Canada, Japan and the US in the run-up to the WTO ministerial conference in 
Seattle in 1999. Trade interests saw a window of opportunity for reclaiming reg-
ulatory authority, given the failure to reach agreement under the CBD earlier 
that year. The proposals were successfully rejected in particular by developing 
countries with explicit reference to the ongoing negotiations under the CBD. 
43. Falkner 2002, 6. 
44. Falkner 2000, 302–303. 
45. We are grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers for raising this point. 
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They considered the negotiations under the CBD as the preferable forum and 
feared that the WTO would seize exclusive jurisdiction over the issue.46 
This inºuence of the biosafety regime on the WTO followed the causal 
mechanism of interaction through commitment and displayed the characteris-
tics of the ideal type of jurisdictional delimitation with disruptive effects on the 
target institution. The case may not be easily recognized because it resulted in a 
non-regulation. On the basis of diverging objectives of both institutions, the 
CBD successfully and increasingly claimed and assumed regulatory authority 
from the WTO for the issue of trade in “living” GMOs from 1995. This had a no-
ticeable effect on the interests of the members of the biosafety regime, which 
were for the most part also parties to the WTO. As a result, the WTO—that cov-
ers a much broader area than GMOs—lost its ability to elaborate detailed rules 
for the sub-area of trade in GMOs that was carved out from its jurisdiction and 
shifted to the biosafety regime. This disruptive effect on the WTO is evident 
from the failure to establish talks on biotechnology under the WTO in 1999. 
Overall, the case demonstrates a rather surprising strength of the seemingly 
weak biosafety regime vis-à-vis the supposedly much stronger WTO. 
3.2 Inºuence of the WTO on the Design of the Cartagena Protocol 
Although the emerging biosafety regime had assumed regulatory authority from 
the WTO, negotiators of the Cartagena Protocol exercised this authority “in the 
shadow of the WTO.” While it was the parties to the biosafety regime (and not 
the parties to the WTO) that decided on the restrictions on trade in GMOs, most 
industrialized countries and many important developing countries were also 
members of the WTO. Other developing countries such as China were expecting 
to join the WTO soon. These countries were inºuenced and limited in their 
choices by existing WTO rules. They had to take into account the possible impli-
cations of the emerging Cartagena Protocol for the interpretation of WTO law. 
They also had a strong incentive to avoid incompatibilities between both instru-
ments, because inconsistent rules could lead to costly conºicts in the imple-
mentation of both agreements. “Interaction through commitment” of the ideal 
type of jurisdictional delimitation disrupted the effectiveness of the Cartagena 
Protocol in two respects. First, the “shadow” of the WTO left its imprint in par-
ticular on the rules on risk assessment and precaution (and socio-economic 
considerations). These rules are at the centre of the Cartagena Protocol because 
they specify the criteria that guide the transboundary movement of LMOs.47 Sec-
ond, the inºuence of the WTO led to the elaboration of provisions clarifying the 
relationship of the Protocol with “other international agreements.” 
Risk assessment, precaution and socioeconomic considerations: Ex-
isting WTO rules affected the preferences of countries negotiating the Cartagena 
46. Palmer, Chaytor, and Werksman 2006; and Falkner 2000, 305. 
47. Graff 2002; and Palmer, Chaytor, and Werksman 2006. 
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Protocol in particular with respect to the provisions on risk assessment, precau-
tion and socioeconomic considerations. These provisions had a high potential 
for inconsistencies with WTO law, which could have led to unwelcome conºicts 
in the implementation of both agreements. Counterfactual reasoning reveals 
that considerations of consistency probably were least important for the posi-
tion of the Miami Group that most forcefully used the argument of WTO com-
patibility. These countries would have strongly opposed restrictions on the free 
trade in GMOs/LMOs even in the absence of relevant WTO rules. However, the 
hands of the Miami Group were strengthened in the Cartagena negotiations be-
cause most other countries including the proponents of strong biosafety provi-
sions such as the EU and the Like-Minded Group of developing countries had 
an interest in avoiding incompatible regulations. Even though these countries 
forcefully defended the regulatory objectives of the biosafety regime, their 
stance was signiªcantly softened due to their wish to avoid incompatible com-
mitments that could diminish the effectiveness of one or even both agreements. 
US non-membership in the CBD further strengthened this interest because it in-
creased the danger of challenges under the WTO dispute settlement proce-
dures.48 
As a result, the risk assessment provisions of the Cartagena Protocol 
largely match and elaborate those of the WTO SPS Agreement. The Protocol 
obliges exporters of certain LMOs (such as LMOs for use as seeds) to seek and 
receive the so-called Advance Informed Agreement of the importing country be-
fore exporting (itself a signiªcant restriction of free trade). Articles 10 and 15 of 
the Protocol require importing countries to base their related decisions on a risk 
assessment and to follow certain procedural steps. LMOs for direct use as food 
or feed, or for processing are generally exempted from the Advance Informed 
Agreement procedure and account for about 90% of trade in GMOs.49 Article 15 
lays down some criteria for conducting risk assessments that are further spe-
ciªed in Annex III of the Protocol. These criteria are more elaborate than those 
of the SPS Agreement but do not diverge from them in any obvious way. In par-
ticular, both regimes clearly require the risk assessment to be science-based.50 
The Protocol provisions on precaution and socioeconomic considerations 
are more problematic, but can also be interpreted in ways that are consistent 
with WTO rules. According to Articles 10.6 and 11.8 of the Protocol, “lack of 
scientiªc certainty due to insufªcient relevant scientiªc information and knowl-
edge regarding the extent of the potential adverse effect of a living modiªed or-
ganism on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity in the 
Party of import, taking also into account risks to human health, shall not pre-
vent that Party from taking a decision, as appropriate, with regard to the import 
[ . . . ] , in order to avoid or minimize such potential adverse effects.” In contrast 
48. Palmer, Chaytor, and Werksman 2006; on the negotiating process see Falkner 2000 and 2002. 
49. Eggers and Mackenzie 2000, 525 and 530. 
50. E.g. Rivera-Torres 2003, 296–298, 313–314; Eggers and Mackenzie 2000, 539; and Stoll 2000, 
113–114. 
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to Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement, this language does not require precaution-
ary action under the Cartagena Protocol to be based upon “available pertinent 
information” or it to be adopted “provisionally.” It also does not require parties 
to seek to obtain additional information and to review the precautionary meas-
ure “within a reasonable period of time.”51 Furthermore, Article 26.1 of the 
Protocol goes beyond the SPS Agreement by allowing countries to “take into ac-
count, consistent with their international obligations, socioeconomic consider-
ations arising from the impact of living modiªed organisms on the conserva-
tion and sustainable use of biological diversity.” These provisions of the 
Cartagena Protocol on precaution and socioeconomic considerations differ 
from the existing WTO rules, but are a priori not inconsistent with them. Both 
sets of rules can be interpreted in consistent ways.52 At the same time, the 
Cartagena provisions may be employed in the interpretation of the related WTO 
rules, which may result in more leeway being granted to biosafety interests. It is 
unclear how and to what extent exactly this might be done by the WTO dispute-
settlement bodies.53 
Overall, the provisions of the Cartagena Protocol relating to risk assess-
ment, precaution and socioeconomic considerations signiªcantly limit the po-
tential for conºict between the Cartagena Protocol and the SPS Agreement. In 
particular, no obvious incompatibilities exist so that countries do not face the 
choice between the Scylla of not complying with the SPS Agreement and the 
Charybdis of not fulªlling their obligations under the Cartagena Protocol. Both 
instruments can be interpreted in mutually supportive ways. At the same time, 
there is no certainty that both agreements will be interpreted in compatible 
ways. Since the area of compatible interpretations has loose boundaries, differ-
ent actors may arrive at different interpretations and may wish to exploit the 
room for maneuver that exists in this respect.54 Therefore, a limited potential for 
interpreting in varying ways what may be considered “compatible” or “mutually 
supportive” remains.55 
Relation with other international agreements: The signiªcance of clarify-
ing the relationship between the WTO and the Cartagena Protocol is rooted in 
the remaining room for different interpretations of both instruments by indi-
vidual parties implementing them, by the conferences of parties and by the rele-
vant judicial processes overseeing their implementation. In particular, the pow-
51. Stoll 2000, 114–117. 
52. E.g. Gupta 2001, 277–279; Boisson de Chazournes and Mbengue 2004, 295–297; Eggers and 
Mackenzie 2000, 539–540; Howse and Meltzer 2002, 488–491; and Rivera-Torres 2003, 308, 
314–315. 
53 . Boisson de Chazournes and Mbengue 2004, 297–301; Eggers and Mackenzie 2000, 541–542; 
and Howse and Meltzer 2002, 488–491. 
54. See Raustiala and Victor 2004 for a similar argument regarding the “regime complex for plant 
genetic resources.” 
55. Similar e.g. Rivera-Torres 2003; Safrin 2002b; Gupta 2001; Eggers and Mackenzie 2000; Howse 
and Meltzer 2002; Cottier 2002; and Stoll 2000. 
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erful dispute-settlement bodies of the WTO are mandated to take into account 
general rules of international law, and have developed a record of doing so (in-
cluding paying attention to the provisions of multilateral environmental agree-
ments).56 
On this basis, one of the main contentious issues in the biosafety negotia-
tions concerned the relationship between the future Cartagena Protocol and the 
WTO. Negotiators of the Cartagena Protocol were aware that both agreements 
could not be considered in isolation. They knew and anticipated that the 
Cartagena Protocol had the potential of inºuencing their obligations under the 
WTO. It may therefore not be surprising that it was the main trading blocks, 
namely the US and the EU, that became particularly involved in the debate. 
Their WTO obligations not only inºuenced but were even constitutive of their 
interests. The so-called Miami Group of LMO exporters (US, Canada, Australia, 
Argentina, Chile, Uruguay) in particular feared that, without a clariªcation, the 
customary lex-posterior rule might have suggested that the later Cartagena Proto-
col takes precedence over earlier WTO rules.57 They therefore suggested a “sav-
ings clause” that would have effectively subordinated the Protocol to other in-
ternational agreements, including the WTO. The EU in particular was opposed 
to such a subordination and favored a balance that would tend more towards 
the Cartagena Protocol (while paying due respect to their obligations under the 
WTO). It would have been content with not addressing the relationship with 
other international organizations at all.58 
The resolution of the issue consists in a compromise somewhere in be-
tween both positions. The balance between the Cartagena Protocol and the 
WTO was deªned in a way that does not subordinate either side to the other 
and treats them as equals. The Protocol parties express their willingness to inter-
pret the Protocol and the WTO agreements in mutually supportive and compat-
ible ways and, in effect, present this as a “peace offer” to be reciprocated by the 
WTO. To this end, three elements were incorporated in the preamble of the Pro-
tocol. First, parties to the Protocol recognize “that trade and environment 
should be mutually supportive with a view to achieving sustainable develop-
ment.” This language implies the suggestion or request to the WTO to respond 
to the Cartagena Protocol by interpreting its own provisions in ways that would 
be compatible with the Protocol obligations. Second, the Protocol parties em-
phasize that the Protocol “shall not be interpreted as implying a change in 
rights and obligations of a Party under any existing international agreements.” 
They thus offer to limit the own regulatory and judicial authority by promising 
that the Protocol organs would not interpret the Protocol in ways that would be 
incompatible with WTO obligations. Third, parties express their understanding 
56. E.g. Boisson de Chazournes and Mbengue 2004, 297–301; and Howse and Meltzer 2002. 
57. Safrin 2002a, 439. 
58. Safrin 2002a; and Alfonso 2002. 
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“that the above recital is not intended to subordinate this Protocol to other in-
ternational agreements.” This provision reinforces the Protocol parties’ claim 
for authority to take relevant decisions and rejects a notion that the Protocol 
would be subordinate to the WTO. Overall, the preamble tries to prevent 
conºicts between both regimes by keeping a ª n e balance between limiting and 
upholding the Protocol’s regulatory authority, while offering guidelines for a 
peaceful co-existence with the WTO.59 
3.3 Overall Assessment: Stepwise Jurisdictional Delimitation 
The interaction between the biosafety regime and the WTO is composed of at 
least two cases in which inºuence runs in opposite directions. The biosafety re-
gime exerted noticeable inºuence on the WTO when it claimed authority to reg-
ulate international trade in GMOs/LMOs from the mid-1990s because this 
move essentially excluded further regulation of this area by the WTO. The pre-
existing regulations of the WTO SPS Agreement, in turn, heavily inºuenced sev-
eral elements of the Cartagena Protocol, including its preamble and the provi-
sions on risk assessment and precaution. Identifying these cases and their causal 
pathways requires disaggregating the interaction relationship between both in-
stitutions. 
The competitive quest of the WTO and the biosafety regime for regulatory 
authority over the newly emerging issue of international trade in GMOs has re-
sulted in a stepwise delimitation of jurisdictions. On the one side, the biosafety 
regime’s negotiations on a biosafety protocol established its regulatory author-
ity over trade in LMOs and thereby removed it, to a large extent, from the WTO. 
On the other side, the WTO agreements of 1994 severely limited the options 
available to biosafety negotiators for regulating trade in GMOs thereby casting 
their “shadow” on the emerging biosafety regime. While each case of interaction 
thus had a disruptive effect on the respective target and involved serious politi-
cal conºicts between the respective policy communities, from a broader gover-
nance perspective the regulatory competition of the two regimes has led to a far-
reaching jurisdictional delimitation. With severely limited room for incompati-
ble interpretations and implementation, the potential for conºict has been 
greatly reduced (even though the result may not be to the liking of one or the 
other side). Both institutions were thus driven towards a jurisdictional delimita-
tion even without a related overarching institutional structure governing this 
process. 
These cases of inter-institutional inºuence followed the causal mechanism 
of interaction through commitment and, more speciªcally, the ideal type of ju-
risdictional delimitation. The interaction was premised on a signiªcant overlap 
in membership of the WTO and the biodiversity regime. As a result, several 
countries that are members of both regimes were committed under one institu-
59. For analyses see Safrin 2002a; Cottier 2002; and Howse and Meltzer 2002. 
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tion when negotiating within the other. Incompatible commitments were 
looming because both the Cartagena Protocol and the WTO aim at regulating 
international trade in GMOs/LMOs and thus overlap in their jurisdictional 
scope. In doing so, they pursue different logics and the competing objectives of 
free international trade (WTO) and of biosafety (Cartagena Protocol). Conse-
quently, importing and exporting countries and the related policy communities 
have different preferences as to the institutional home of regulation. At the 
same time, regulation by one institution inevitably affects the chances of the 
other side to realize its objectives. Based on the interest of countries that are 
members of both institutions in avoiding incompatible commitments, this situ-
ation created a demand for delimitation of the jurisdictions of the two institu-
tions. 
The interaction between the biosafety regime and the WTO reveals the par-
ticular structure of jurisdictional delimitation issues in global environmental 
governance. The members of both the source institution and the target institu-
tion are in a “mixed motive” situation that resembles the game-theoretic con-
stellation of the Battle of the Sexes60. On the one hand, they possess a common 
interest in some sort of separation of jurisdictions because neither the WTO nor 
the Cartagena Protocol can be content with a conºict that disturbs both interna-
tional trade and environmental protection. On the other hand, the constituen-
cies of both institutions have conºicting preferences that make it notoriously 
difªcult to ª n d a mutually acceptable solution. Actors favoring free trade will 
advocate regulation by the WTO, while countries (and other actors) struggling 
for far-reaching domestic environmental regulation will prefer enlarged juris-
diction of the Cartagena Protocol. The governance challenge consists in arriving 
at a delimitation of jurisdictions that balances the diverging interests and real-
izes the common interests. 
In jurisdictional delimitation cases, the institution that regulates ªrst pos-
sesses a “ªrst-mover advantage.”61 Equilibria of Battle of Sexes situations are 
comparatively stable. Commitments existing within one institution will there-
fore almost automatically limit the room for maneuver within negotiations of 
the other institution (if conºict is to be avoided). With the conclusion of the 
WTO agreements in 1994, the world trade regime thus secured a ªrst-mover ad-
vantage by determining requirements that restrictions by importing countries 
had to meet. While some members of the biosafety regime might have preferred 
open conºict with the WTO, states that are members of both institutions had an 
interest in avoiding incompatible commitments and open conºict. 
Hence, the Cartagena Protocol’s successful assumption of jurisdictional 
authority from the WTO came at a price: it was dependant on accepting the lat-
ter’s basic regulatory approach. As a consequence, the Cartagena Protocol comes 
close to setting maximum standards, which is unusual for international environ-
60. Stein 1982; and Keohane 1984. 
61. Héritier 1996; and Mattli 2003. 
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mental agreements. Most of them deªne minimum levels of action countries are 
required to take because countries have incentives to implement low protection 
standards, while exceeding these standards is unproblematic and even contrib-
utes to achieving the environmental objective pursued. In contrast, the 
Cartagena Protocol not only determines a (minimum) standard to be followed 
by all countries (including developing countries), but also, by introducing cer-
tain criteria for risk assessment and precaution, effectively limits the level of 
protection that countries can justify regarding the import of LMOs. To be sure, 
the Protocol stops short of requiring importing countries to permit LMO ship-
ments into their territory if the prescribed risk assessment does not, with 
sufªcient scientiªc certainty, identify a certain level of risk—even though one 
may argue that such a requirement may be implicit in its rules. In effect, how-
ever, it speciªes the pre-existing WTO maximum standards of regulation which 
WTO members are required not to exceed in order to facilitate free trade. Only 
by accepting the market-creation logic and the existing limitations established 
by the WTO, could the Protocol successfully determine what it deemed to be 
consistent with pre-existing WTO rules. As a result, the Protocol primarily fur-
ther speciªes, interprets and develops pre-existing WTO rules with respect to 
GMOs/LMOs, exploiting the room for interpretation that the relevant WTO 
agreements had left. If not in the formal legal sense,62 it de facto constitutes a lex 
specialis to the WTO agreements (in particular the SPS Agreement). 
4. Possible Future Interaction and Policy Implications 
Even after the delimitation of jurisdictions of the WTO and the Cartagena Pro-
tocol, interaction between the two institutions can be expected to continue. 
General rules can never account for all speciªc circumstances of the particular 
cases to which they apply. They must be interpreted implicitly or explicitly, and 
interpretation provides margins of discretion. Assuming that both the relevant 
WTO rules, especially its SPS Agreement, and the Cartagena Protocol remain 
unchanged for the foreseeable future, several possible future cases of interaction 
can be anticipated. In this section, we spell out these possible future interac-
tions and explore both their origins and effects on the basis of a ceteris-paribus 
assumption: We assume that countries will continue to differ in their interests 
as to the appropriate balance between trade and biosafety objectives, but that 
the contracting parties will be prepared to honor clear-cut commitments en-
tered into under either institution.63 
Future Behavioral Interaction: Interaction between the two institutions 
will inevitably continue because the implementation of their rules by the con-
62. Howse and Meltzer 2002. 
63 . Both institutions may actually be seen as belonging to a larger “regime complex” (Raustiala and 
Victor 2004) including, inter alia, the International Plant Protection Convention and the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission. For the importance of these two institutions for the conºict over 
GMO trade, see for example Homeyer 2006. Our focus here is on the two principal interna-
tional institutions involved in this conºict, the WTO and the biosafety regime. 
Sebastian Oberthür and Thomas Gehring • 21 
tracting parties is closely interdependent. Through their unilaterally determined 
domestic action, the member states will inevitably inºuence the trade-off be-
tween the competing objectives of free trade and biosafety and affect the perfor-
mance of both relevant international institutions. Every state action concerning 
trade in GMOs/LMOs simultaneously implements the rules of the SPS Agree-
ment and the Cartagena Protocol. The farther a country restricts the import of 
GMOs/LMOs under the Cartagena Protocol, the more it will undermine the 
free-trade objective of the WTO. And the more liberally a state regulates such 
imports in line with the free-trade objective, the less it will conform to the ob-
jective of the Cartagena Protocol to ensure an adequate level of protection 
against the risks associated with trade in GMOs/LMOs.64 
This interdependence reºects the logic of behavioral interaction (see sec-
tion 2.2.2). It does not immediately originate from the rules of the source insti-
tution, but from the implementation of these rules by individual actors operat-
ing within the institution’s issue area. It does not directly affect the decision-
making of the target institution, but the performance of the latter within its own 
issue-area. The occurrence of behavioral interaction does not require collective 
decisions, but results from the unilateral implementation of existing decisions 
by relevant public or private actors. Over time, the implementation of individ-
ual actors will generate an order reºecting the accepted balance between trade 
interests and environmental interests. The exact nature of this order is yet un-
known because implementation of the biosafety regime is still at an early stage.65 
All else being equal, biosafety interests tend to have an advantage over 
free-trade interests in behavioral interaction. A country predominantly inter-
ested in biosafety can itself limit GMO imports accordingly, because it controls 
its own domestic customs boundaries. Because of the interdependence of trade 
and biosafety objectives, this will undermine the free trade in GMOs/LMOs. In 
contrast, a country prioritizing free trade cannot achieve its objective unilater-
ally, because at least two countries are involved in international trade. Thus, ex-
porting countries are not in control of the import side. WTO law also prohibits 
unilateral trade sanctions. Overall, countries interested in biosafety therefore 
are in a better position to draw the balance between both objectives into their 
preferred direction in domestic implementation than countries favoring free 
trade. In accordance with our ceteris-paribus assumption, this advantage 
reaches its limits where the national implementation clearly disregards existing 
WTO commitments. We should also caution that obviously other factors will 
inºuence whether or not interested countries will actually exploit the room for 
more restrictive regulation of GMO imports. 
Possible Further Action within the WTO: Within the WTO, the delimita-
tion of jurisdictions between the two institutions might be further deªned in re-
sponse to exceedingly restrictive GMO import regulation. The WTO provides for 
at least two ways of diminishing the discretion left by the rules of the SPS Agree-
64. See also Burgiel 2002, 59–60. 
65. Gupta forthcoming. 
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ment and the Cartagena Protocol, namely the court-like dispute settlement 
mechanism and political decision-making by the contracting parties. A ªnding 
of the Dispute Settlement Body could result in a further deªnition of the appli-
cable rules, because every (quasi-)judicial application of existing rules necessar-
ily involves law-making.66 
The powerful WTO dispute settlement mechanism provides a promising 
forum for countries with strong trade interests, because the mechanism has the 
objective of protecting free-trade against unjustiªed restrictions. Interested 
countries may therefore challenge bold unilateral restrictions of trade in 
GMOs/LMOs under the Cartagena Protocol. The scope for such legal challenges 
primarily stems from the remaining potential for tensions in the interpretation 
of the Cartagena Protocol and the WTO agreements by individual countries. 
Whereas the Cartagena Protocol provides additional justiªcation for countries 
interested in restricting trade in GMOs/LMOs—and may be supported by provi-
sions of the Codex Alimentarius Commission and the International Plant Pro-
tection Convention67—countries privileging trade can employ judicial action to 
limit this room. A ªrst relevant challenge of EU restrictions on trade in GMOs 
by the US, Canada and Argentina is already pending under the WTO and may 
result in the judicial development of rules relevant for the interaction between 
the WTO and the Cartagena Protocol—even though the challenge is not directly 
related to the Protocol.68 
Countries with strong biosafety interests could attempt to achieve political 
decisions within the WTO to shift the delimitation of jurisdictions in their favor. 
Any political WTO decision addressing the issue would have to at least acknowl-
edge the Cartagena Protocol. Pending is, ªrst, the proposal for the SPS Commit-
tee to recognize the Cartagena Protocol as an international standard-setting 
body under the SPS Agreement. This step would formally introduce the rules of 
the Cartagena Protocol into the world trade system, alongside the standards of 
the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the International Plant Protection Con-
vention and the Ofªce International des Epizooties.69 Beyond the recognition of 
the current rules of the Cartagena Protocol, the proposal would shift the juris-
dictional balance towards the Protocol by implicitly also recognizing its future 
decisions—which does not improve its prospect of being accepted. Second, the 
larger problem of the tension between the world trade system and multilateral 
environmental agreements with trade restricting effects is part of the agenda of 
the Doha round of trade negotiations. Any decision on the matter would imme-
diately affect the interaction between the WTO and the Cartagena Protocol. 
However, both options for political decision-making have little prospect of 
adoption because they face the well-known resistance by the US, that is not a 
party to the CBD and its Cartagena Protocol (and unlikely to join them in the 
66. Shapiro 1981, 28–36. 
67. Homeyer 2006. 
68. Boisson de Chazournes and Mbengue 2004; and Gupta forthcoming. 
69. Rivera-Torres 2003, 312–313. 
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foreseeable future70). Progress on the larger issue of the relationship between 
the WTO and multilateral environmental agreements also faces skepticism and 
opposition by developing countries fearing a new wave of protectionism.71 
In every case of political or judicial decision-making, the WTO will be the 
target of interaction through commitment originating from the Cartagena Pro-
tocol. Decision-making within the WTO will always occur in light of, and thus 
be affected by, the rules of the Protocol (and other international institutions 
such as the Codex Alimentarius Commission). Political decision-making can 
hardly be expected to produce decisions which are in open conºict with the 
Protocol, because the overwhelming majority of states, being members of 
both institutions, would strive to avoid incompatible commitments. Even non-
members of the Cartagena Protocol, such as the United States, are likely to have 
little interest in making the agreements mutually incompatible, since this might 
harm the legitimacy of the WTO. Likewise, the WTO dispute settlement organs 
are mandated to take into account general rules of international law and act on 
behalf, and in the interest, of member states. Since open conºict would endan-
ger the legitimacy and governance capacity of the WTO, it should have an inter-
est in working, to the extent possible, towards a modus vivendi rather than a pos-
sible escalation.72 Indeed, the WTO dispute-settlement organs have already 
developed a record of taking into account the provisions of multilateral envi-
ronmental agreements and, to this end, they could exchange information with 
or ask for advisory opinions of the Cartagena Protocol, in particular its new 
compliance committee.73 
Relevant judicial or political decision-making will affect the behavioral in-
teraction between the WTO and the Cartagena Protocol. A signiªcant redeªni-
tion of the delimitation of jurisdictions will inevitably inºuence domestic im-
plementation (unless contracting parties choose to ignore and trespass valid 
rules). If the Dispute Settlement Body rejects bold restrictions of trade in 
GMOs/LMOs, WTO members must adapt their measures accordingly, or else 
face trade sanctions. In contrast, if the Dispute Settlement Body accepts a broad 
range of domestic measures to ensure biosafety, this may encourage originally 
hesitating countries to strengthen their restrictions on GMO imports. A political 
recognition of Cartagena rules within the world trade system can be expected to 
have a similar effect. In any event, a further speciªcation of the delimitation of 
jurisdictions within the WTO would have to be taken into account under, and 
would thus inºuence, the Cartagena Protocol. 
Possible Further Action under the Cartagena Protocol: Within the 
Cartagena Protocol, a further delimitation of jurisdictions under the WTO 
might be responded to by its own judicial or political decision-making. A judi-
70. Brunnée 2004, 623–624. 
71. E.g. Araya 2001; and Gnath 2004. 
72. Similar Howse and Meltzer 2002; and Eggers and Mackenzie 2000, 540–542. 
73 . Similar Eggers and Mackenzie 2000, 541–542; Boisson de Chazournes and Mbengue 2004, 
297–301; and Howse and Meltzer 2002. 
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cial decision could result from a legal challenge of a country’s regulation of 
trade in GMOs/LMOs under the compliance mechanism of the Cartagena Pro-
tocol established in 2004.74 In particular, triggering this compliance procedure 
constitutes a strategic policy option as a counter-measure of biosafety interests 
against a WTO challenge especially because a party may trigger the procedure 
against itself. If its own domestic measures are challenged under WTO law, a 
party interested in biosafety could thereby seek to obtain support of the 
biosafety regime on the matter and thereby increase the pressure on the WTO 
dispute-settlement bodies to take into account and respect the Cartagena Proto-
col. With both (quasi-) judicial processes investigating the same case, the pres-
sure to enter into some (informal) inter-judicial exchange ensuring compatible 
ªndings would rise. Relevant political decisions in response to the WTO could be 
taken by the conference of the parties to the Cartagena Protocol. Interested par-
ties could seek adoption of additional rules to further de ªne the jurisdictional 
delimitation of the regime vis-à-vis the WTO, for example with respect to risk as-
sessment and precaution, as appropriate. 
The scope for such judicial and political decision-making will be limited 
in turn by interaction through commitment originating from the WTO. It is 
hardly conceivable that the conference of the parties to the Cartagena Protocol 
or its compliance committee would ignore the WTO commitments of the vast 
majority of parties. Moreover, the preamble of the Protocol virtually instructs 
those interpreting the agreement—be it the conference of the parties or the 
compliance committee—to take into account the WTO regulations, which 
would include any decisions taken by the WTO on relevant matters. Under these 
circumstances, initiatives under the Cartagena Protocol cannot be expected to 
move the jurisdictional boundaries signiªcantly in favor of biosafety, but pri-
marily to counter attempts of the world trade system to privilege trade interests 
(or to carefully further specify the existing balance). 
As in the case of the WTO, relevant judicial or political decision-making 
can be expected to affect the behavioral interaction between the WTO and the 
Cartagena Protocol. First of all, contracting parties must adjust their domestic 
implementation measures to the new rules. Measures ruled out under the Proto-
col cannot be sincerely applied any more and will almost certainly be consid-
ered as a violation of WTO commitments. And measures explicitly accepted un-
der the Protocol may even be adopted by parties which were originally hesitant 
because they feared trade conºicts. 
Also in line with the effects of further decision-making on the matter 
within the WTO, secondary rules adopted under the Cartagena Protocol would 
modify the decision situation within the WTO. They will have to be taken into 
account in subsequent judicial and political decision-making and thus create a 
further case of interaction through commitment of the jurisdictional delimita-
tion type. This could be followed by further decision-making within the WTO 
that would similarly inºuence the conditions for further decision-making under 
74. CBD 2004; and Mackenzie 2004, 272–273. 
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the Cartagena Protocol, and so on. The potential for the continuation of this 
feedback process is only constrained by the limited room that is available in 
both regimes for advancing decision-making while staying compatible with the 
commitments of the other side. 
5. Conclusion 
The separate exploration of several relevant cases of interaction reveals the par-
ticularities of the complex interdependence of the WTO and the Cartagena Pro-
tocol. Our conceptual approach of disaggregating complex interaction situa-
tions into individual cases of interaction allows for the clear identiªcation of 
causal relationships between both institutions. The varying inºuence exerted by 
the WTO on the biosafety regime and vice versa becomes clearly visible. The 
analysis of the causal mechanism driving each case of interaction allows for the 
identiªcation of crucial factors that have shaped the interaction as well as its 
consequences. By re-aggregating the individual cases, we acquire a broader pic-
ture of the driving forces and consequences at work. Since many of the factors 
underlying and shaping the interaction are likely to remain inºuential, their 
identiªcation provides a solid basis for assessing the future relationship of both 
regimes and the policy options available in this respect. 
The overall interaction appears as a stepwise delimitation of jurisdictional 
authority. It is composed of several separate interaction cases that follow the 
causal mechanism of interaction through commitment and, more speciªcally, 
concern jurisdictional delimitation issues. On the one side, the WTO agree-
ments of 1994 restricted the ability of the Cartagena Protocol to regulate trade 
in GMOs/LMOs. On the other side, the Cartagena Protocol has limited the 
scope for further regulation of this area by the WTO. The stepwise jurisdictional 
delimitation has been driven by the institutions’ different objectives as sup-
ported by two groups of states and policy communities as well as by the interest 
of states that are members of both institutions in avoiding incompatible com-
mitments. 
Eventually, the relationship between both agreements is to be worked out 
further in their implementation “on the ground.” Although future rule-making 
within either of the two institutions will have to take into account the commit-
ments entered into by the member states of the other institution, the momen-
tum of the future interdependence between the two institutions will largely be 
determined by behavioral interaction. Because domestic implementation of one 
institution will simultaneously affect the performance of the other one, coun-
tries regulating trade in GMOs/LMOs will, within the existing margin for inter-
pretation, decide on the exact balance between the objectives of free trade and 
biosafety. With the Cartagena Protocol having addressed the relationship with 
the WTO, its evolving domestic implementation is likely to be the focal point of 
future interaction with the world trade system. 
The delimitation of jurisdictions of the WTO and the Cartagena Protocol 
has developed in the absence of centralized coordination. Since there is no suit-
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able overarching international institution that could accommodate conºicting 
commitments with each other, the members of multilateral treaty systems resort 
to collective decision-making within either of the institutions involved, while 
taking into account the objectives of the other institution. The transmission belt 
introducing external objectives into the internal decision processes of either in-
stitution is the joint membership of both institutions of the vast majority of par-
ties. The twin-members have an interest in both regulatory objectives con-
cerned, and will therefore tend to avoid incompatible commitments. Hence, in 
spite of the tension between the objectives of the WTO and the Cartagena Proto-
col and despite the diverging interests of the member states as to the appropri-
ate balance between them, certain features of the system of international gover-
nance drive the institutions towards an accommodation even in the absence of 
a coordinating institution. As a result, there is a good chance that both regimes 
will develop further in consistent ways in the future. 
However, the largely successful delimitation of jurisdictions does not im-
ply that the balance found is necessarily to the liking of all actors involved. Ju-
risdictions can be delimited in different ways with different effects on outcomes. 
The exact balance struck is largely a matter of the distribution of power between 
the institutions involved. The trade side successfully secured a ªrst-mover ad-
vantage by structuring the regulatory ªe ld through the WTO agreements of 
1994, most importantly the SPS Agreement, so that biosafety negotiators had to 
operate from the very beginning in this “shadow of the WTO.” However, the 
seemingly weak Cartagena Protocol showed surprising strength in assuming 
regulatory authority from the allegedly powerful WTO and in exploiting the re-
maining room for maneuver. As a result, an effective protection of biological 
safety has gained support. Whether the resulting balance is sufªcient for this 
purpose will only become apparent during the implementation of both agree-
ments. 
Obviously, whether the existing balance will actually provide the basis for 
a stable solution of the inter-institutional conºict will also depend on, and be 
inºuenced by, exogenous factors. For example, the further development of the 
societal conºict over the use of biotechnology and GMOs, which underpins the 
institutional interaction between the WTO and the Cartagena Protocol, is 
difªcult to predict. Thus, the emergence of a major GMO food scare may have 
repercussions on the relationship between these international institutions, as 
may the more subtle evolution of related public attitudes that is inºuenced by a 
number of further factors. 
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